Introduction
After the Soviet Union collapsed, the New Independent States inherited pieces of the Soviet banking system. While the new banking systems had identical initial conditions, their subsequent development has depended on country-specific factors such as legislation, state policy, country size, etc.
Only the banking systems in the three largest former-Soviet states (the Russian Federation, the Republic of Ukraine, and the Republic of Kazakhstan) possess enough banks to perform meaningful econometric analysis. Further, the data limitations in the case of Ukraine compel us to limit our scope of analysis exclusively to the Kazakh and Russian banking systems. Kazakhstan's banking system somewhat defies common expectations as it is institutionally more advanced than the Russian system. Despite the vast literature on bank efficiency, only a few papers consider the efficiency of Russian banks, and, to the best of our knowledge, only a single paper (Fries and Taci, 2005) , discusses the efficiency of banks in Kazakhstan.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature on two issues.
First, we compare the efficiency of Kazakhstan and Russian banks during 2002-2006, a period of relatively stable economic development in both countries. In contrast to Fries and Taci (2005) , who found banks to be more efficient in Kazakhstan than in Russia, we find no significant difference in bank efficiency between the two countries.
Second, we compare bank rankings according to efficiency estimates derived from different models (input and output sets) and different specifications of error distribution in the cost function. Most papers consider just one model specification and make conclusions on bank efficiency based on the chosen model, leaving open the issue of how robust those conclusions are to the model specification. We use two models and three error specifications for each model, and conclude that bank efficiency ratings crucially depend on the model (i.e. the chosen set of outputs and factors) and do not significantly depend on error specification.
Finally, most banks in Kazakhstan and Russia appear to be below their optimal size. 6 2 Literature review Koopmans (1951) introduced the concept of technical efficiency, i.e. a firm is technically efficient when it is not possible to generate more output with the same inputs. It is assumed that the inability of a firm to produce the maximum possible volume of output can be explained by inefficient management. Farrell (1957) suggests a non-parametric approach to measure technical efficiency by a linear programming method designated as data envelopment analysis (DEA). Though widely used, DEA suffers numerous shortcomings such as sensitivity to random deviations, outliers, and data errors. It also requires large datasets. Aigner et al. (1977) , and Meeusen and Broeck (1977) propose a parametric approach to measure technical efficiency: stochastic frontier analysis (SFA).
Both methods are intensively used in the analysis of the efficiency of banks and financial institutions. In the review by , approximately half of 130 studies used a parametric approach. Berger and Mester (1997) discuss various SFA models and come to the conclusion that the models (in terms of cost efficiency and profit efficiency) give approximately the same estimates of technical efficiency of US banks using data for 1990-1995. Bauer et al. (1998) compares variants of different approaches (DEA, SFA, as well as the distribution free approach, DFA, and the thick frontier approach, TFA) to measure the efficiency of US banks over the period [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] . They conclude that, given the same set of four inputs and four outputs, parametric and nonparametric methods are not mutually consistent.
Most papers dealing with the technical efficiency of banks study just one country. Among the first papers comparing the technical efficiency of banks in different countries was the study of Maudos et al. (2002) , who consider the cost efficiency and profit efficiency of banks in ten leading EU countries during 1993-1996. The sample included 3,328 observations of 832 banks. The authors conclude that the estimated cost efficiency is lower than the estimated profit efficiency and that the correlation between the two estimates is low. Mid-sized banks and banks with a high ratio of loans to assets are found to be most efficient. Market concentration positively correlates with profit efficiency and negatively with cost efficiency.
The following papers present an analysis of banks in developing countries. Weill (2003) analyzes banks in the Czech Republic and Poland. Foreign-owned banks are found to be more efficient than domestic-owned banks. Battese and Coelli (1995) . As in most of the papers mentioned above, they also use the BankScope 1 database and give the standard caveats about its data imperfections (see e.g. Bonin et al., 2005b A high ratio of past due loans is negatively related to efficiency. The larger the bank, the greater its efficiency. As we might expect, this relation is weaker for large banks, since large banks diversify their activities and their efficiency in issuing loans may be lower than that of specialized mid-sized banks.
Golovan et al. (2008) As of January 1, 2007, the Russian banking system consisted of 1,189 banks, a significant share of which consisted of small banks. The average Russian bank was significantly smaller than the average Kazakh bank (see Table 1 ).
The structure of the Kazakhstan banking sector is similar to the structure of the banking sector in Russia. The National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan (the analog to CBR), is responsible for money liquidity and regulates the activity of the commercial banks. As of January 1, 2007, the Kazakhstan banking system consisted of 33 second-tier banks. Note that 59% of the total assets of the banking system belonged to Kazakhstan's Big Three: Kazkommertsbank, Bank TuranAlem (BTA Bank), and Halyk Savings Bank of Kazakhstan.
At the end of 2006, the relative size of the Kazakhstan banking system (in terms of total assets to GDP or total equity to GDP) was almost twice that of the Russian banking system. The relative volume of issued loans was significantly higher (61.5% in Kazakhstan versus 30.2% in Russia), while the relative volume of deposits did not differ significantly (48.4% versus 31.4%).
This points to differences in the structure of fund sources.
The Kazakhstan banking system continued to boom in 2006. Total assets, equity and fixed capital increased by 97%, 100%, and 66%, respectively. This was significantly higher than the indicators for the Russian banking system (44%, 36%, and 9%, respectively).
Data
For a correct comparative analysis of the two banking systems it is highly desirable -and somewhat problematic − to use bank data for the two countries in the same accounting system. is that these data comply with a single set of rules. The disadvantage is that the number of Russian banks is limited to banks with a Moody's rating. This means that we must deal with a nonrepresentative sample biased toward large banks interested in having a rating to gain access to the international financial market. Comparing Tables 1 and 2 , we see the average size of the Russian bank in the sample is larger than the average size of the Kazakh bank in the sample (and vice versa for the banking systems as a whole). This indicates a significant non-homogeneity of banks and a bias of the sample toward large banks. Particularly significant is the difference in personnel expenses and fixed assets (much larger for Russian banks). Kazakh banks have more than double the borrowings of Russian banks; this is the difference in the sources of funding noted above.
The average values of some indicators of banks' efficiency over the sample for the end of 2006 are presented in Table 3 . For each country, the average of ratios and the ratio of averages of the indicator is presented (e.g. average value of equity to assets ratios and ratio of average equity to average assets). 6 Due to the non-homogeneity of the banks in the samples, these values are different. The differences in these values indicate the shapes of the distributions of the indicators over the 5 As calculated by AFN data. This does not correspond to Tables 1 and 2, because Table 2 presents data on consolidated balance sheets of Kazakh banks, while Table 1 presents data from the AFN site, which is derived from unconsolidated balance sheets. The main differences stem from the reporting of Kazkommertsbank and Bank TuranAlem. Expert RA data differ from AFN data for the same reason. 6 Equal to the ratio of total equity to total assets, as calculated for the sample.
12 sample. For example, the ROA profitability of large Russian banks is higher than the ROA of small Russian banks. The reverse is true for Kazakhstan.
The ratio of deposits to assets is higher for Russian banks and the ratio of borrowings to assets is lower for Russian banks than for Kazakhstan banks. Other indicators calculated by the sample do not differ significantly. We use the following definition of (in)efficiency as formulated by Berger and Mester (1997) .
Cost efficiency shows how close a bank's expenditures are to the best examples given the same output and environment. Assuming a multiplicative form of inefficiency, the cost function can be written as
Here, C represents expenditures (costs); w factor prices; y output; z fixed factors (resources, output); q environment variables that might influence output, v a random error, and u inefficiency.
It is assumed that 0 Ev , and that 0 u .
Currently, the most common choice for the functional form of the cost function (1) is the translog specification (2) 
different specifications of the cost functions (1) and (2):
The first model includes a single output (loans) and the prices of three factors: labor, fixed capital, and funds. We use the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets as a proxy for the price of labor. This is a common choice in the absence of data on the quantity of personnel (see e.g. Carvallo and Kasman, 2005) . We use the ratio of differences between operational expenses and personnel expenses to fixed assets as a proxy for the price of fixed capital. The price of funds is calculated by dividing total interest expenses by total deposits The second model includes three outputs (loans, deposits, borrowings) and the prices of two factors (labor, fixed capital). For both models the full translog specification (2) is used.
The first model compares banks with the same volume of loans and same prices, so that banks may optimize their costs by varying the volumes of their deposits and borrowings. The second model compares banks with equal volumes of loans, deposits, and borrowings. Thus, the second model leaves less room to optimize expenditures. It is likely that the average efficiency estimates given by the first model will be lower than under the second model as many banks cannot vary deposits and borrowing volumes due to institutional restrictions.
For both models, we use the three specifications of the error distributions and the inefficiency component mentioned above. STATA was used for the estimating. Usually, the estimate of 14 the value exp ( | ) ce E u u v was used as a measure of bank efficiency in specification (1), which has values from the interval [0, 1]; the closer ce is to 1, the more efficient the bank. An exact formula for the calculation of efficiency can be found, e.g. in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) .
In the specification of the error terms in (2), vector g contains four components: the intercept, the dummy variable for Kazakhstan, a proxy for capital sufficiency (the ratio of equity to assets) and its square for the first model, and equity and assets for the second model. In the specification of the error terms in (3), the vector () u z consists of two components: the intercept and the dummy variable for Kazakhstan, and vector () v z consists of three components: the intercept, the log of equity, and the square of the log of equity.
Full control for the external country and time-specific factors was used in all specifications: vector it d contains ten components, i.e. ten year-country dummies for the two countries and the five years of observations (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) .
In all six models (both model types and three specifications of the error term for each type), inefficiency is found to be statistically significant.
Time invariant efficiency. The six models described above assume the possibility that inefficiency varies with time. De Young (1997) argues that for a four-to-six-year period it is reasonable to suppose that the inefficiency is time invariant. We also consider estimates for time-invariant efficiency, which we estimate in several ways. First, we use averaged efficiency estimates derived from the six models given above. Second, we estimate a random effect panel data model (3). which is similar to the model (2) except that the inefficiency u is time invariant: 
In this approach at least one bank achieves an efficiency score of 1.
We include time dummies and their cross terms with the country dummy in the cost functions in both (2) and (4). This implies that we suppose that the cost function in the two countries could differ by a factor that varies with time and country. In this way we achieve full control for 15 differences in the macroeconomic environments in the two countries. This is necessary, since, as pointed out by Berger (2007) , banks that operate in different nations often face highly disparate prudential supervisory and regulatory conditions, labor laws, market conditions (such as competition for inputs or outputs), and levels of financial market evolution. All these factors may affect a bank's cost performance, resulting in the possibility that it is measured as being a certain distance from the common frontier for reasons totally unrelated to its competence in minimizing costs. A comprehensive discussion of the common production frontier problem can be found in Berger 
Results
Average values of efficiency estimates over countries and years are presented in Table 5 and Figure   3 in the Appendix. These were calculated in accordance with the first model for three specifications of the error term (ce1, ce2, ce3), and in accordance with the second model (ce4, ce5, ce6).
The estimate ce2 is quite different from the other estimates. This could be a technical difficulty of estimation: finding the extreme of a function of several variables is an algorithmically complex problem. Moreover, it is difficult to find the same set of factors
second specification of errors for both models due to problems with the convergence of the algorithm. Thus, we use the equity to assets ratio, its square, and the Kazakhstan dummy variable as the set of
L g g g factors in the second specification for the first model (ce2 estimate), and logs of equity and assets, and the Kazakhstan dummy variable in the second specification for the second model (ce5 estimate).
Tests show that mean bank efficiency in all models does not differ statistically for the two countries. This result differs from the conclusion of Fries and Taci (2005) , who find Kazakh banks more efficient than Russian banks based on data for the period 1994-2001. 16 This difference in conclusions can be explained in several ways:
1) Different periods of observations (1994-2001 and 2002-2006) .
2) The 1994-2001 period includes the financial crisis of 1998, which is an outlier in the data and in a regression results are often driven by an outlier.
3) Different models are used. Fries and Taci (2005) use a model with two outputs (deposits and loans) and one price (the ratio of operation expenditures to total assets). This model does not take into account borrowings of Kazakh banks, which were especially high the last few years, and so this model may not be adequate to estimate the situation for the that the inclusion of country-level variables in the regression allow us to take into account possible differences in the cost function for the two countries due to differing bank environments (taxes, interest rates, legislation). In our model specifications (2) and (3) we have full control of country-specific external factors, including time dummies and cross terms of time dummies with the Kazakhstan dummy.
The first explanation is supported by Styrin (2005) and Golovan (2006) , who find an increasing efficiency of Russian banks during the periods 1999-2002 and 2003-2005. Regardless of the surprisingly low ce2 estimates for Kazakh banks, the rankings of the bank-year observations by estimated efficiency for different specifications of the first and the second model are quite close to each other, especially in a one-country framework. Spearman rankorder correlations are presented in Table 6 in the Appendix. The correlation for one model type and one country are all above 0.82 (0.91, if the ce2 estimate is dropped).
However, rankings by the two model types differ significantly. This is hardly surprising as the models themselves differ significantly. The first model considers cost efficiency by comparing banks with the same volume of loans and factor prices (including deposit prices). The second model considers cost efficiency by comparing banks with the same volume of loans, deposits, and borrowings.
This difference in models also explains the differences in changes in the average efficiency over time (see Table 5 and Figure 3 in the Appendix). For example, if we consider the first specification for both models, we conclude that the average bank efficiency of Kazakh banks decreases with time according to the first model (ce1), but this effect is not observed in the second model Here, i y are outputs. If scale < 1, then banks operate below the optimal scale levels and can reduce costs by increasing output. Let scale1 to scale6 be the measures of the scale economies calculated for each of our six models. Table 4 presents the average values over five years of observation of these measures separately for Russian and Kazakh banks. The first and third quartiles of the estimated distributions of efficiency are also presented. Since most efficiency scores are below 1, most banks would benefit from getting bigger. This conclusion is supported by Figure 4 in the Appendix, which presents histograms of the measures scale3 and scale6 for the sample of Russian banks. Figure 2 presents the evolution of the average values of the estimated measure of scale economies scale1 for the samples of banks from the two countries. For both countries this measure increases over time. Therefore, in both countries the banking systems were moving in the direction of minimizing relative costs. The measures scale2-scale6 lead to the same conclusion, so the choice of model is not important here. use formula (4) to calculate DFA estimates of efficiency, and dfce1 and dfce2 for the first and second model, respectively. We have five estimates of time invariant efficiency for model 1 (dfce1, ce01, ce1m, ce2m, ce3m) and five estimates for model 2 (dfce2, ce02, ce4m, ce5m, ce6m) . Spearman rank-order correlations of these ten efficiency estimates are presented in Table 8 At least in this case, we must conclude that the efficiency ranking depends crucially on the chosen model (inputs, outputs) and very little on assumptions concerning the distribution of errors.
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Conclusions
In this paper, we considered the robustness of various specifications of cost-efficiency models using data for Kazakh and Russian banks over the period 2002-2006. We find that the ranking of the banks according to the estimated cost efficiency largely depends upon the model specification (the chosen set of outputs and factors). The specification of the distribution of the error term has a much smaller impact on the ranking.
As expected, the model with three outputs (our second model) produces higher values of cost efficiency on average than the model with a single output.
In contrast to Fries and Taci (2005) , we do not find a statistically significant difference in the cost efficiency of banks in Kazakhstan and Russia. It could be that this difference became insignificant as the two banking systems evolved after 2001. An alternative explanation is that the specification of the cost function used by Fries and Taci (2005) does not distinguish between deposits and borrowings.
Most banks in both countries are still below their optimal size. However, both banking systems are moving toward optimization of relative costs. 
